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 Money, Credit, and Banking in Precolonial Africa
 The Yoruba Experience
 A. G. Adebayo
 Abstract. - Scholarship in African economic history has been
 dominated by a wave of revisionism lately. The degree of
 African indebtedness, the imperatives of loan repayment, and
 the long-term implications of ongoing political and economic
 changes, all make such a revision exigent indeed. Focusing on
 the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, this paper produces new
 evidence to reinterpret and redefine African precolonial finan-
 cial institutions. The paper has two main parts. Part 1 focuses
 on the introduction of cowrie currency into Yorubaland and its
 impact on social stratification. Part 2 examines ajo, the savings
 institution, esusu, the rotating savings and credit associations
 (roscas), and the process of capital formation and accumula-
 tion among the Yoruba. [Nigeria, Yoruba, rotating savings and
 credit associations (roscas), capital formation, accumulation,
 cowries; social stratification]
 A. G. Adebayo, Ph.D., Associate Prof, of History at Kennesaw
 State College, Marietta, Georgia. He was formerly Visiting
 Prof, at the York University, Toronto, Canada, and Senior
 Lecturer at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nige-
 ria. - Publicatons include: Embattled Federalism: A History
 of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria (1993); he has contributed
 several chapters to books and has published numerous articles
 in learned journals; cf. also References Cited.
 Introduction
 After the pioneering works of the late Marion
 Johnson (1968, 1970) and of other economic histo-
 rians of Africa,1 there seems at first sight to be very
 little to add to the existing knowledge of the im-
 portation, distribution, and use of cowrie currency
 in West Africa. It has been demonstrated beyond
 all doubts that, to use Johnson's very apt words,
 "West African cowrie currencies . . . [were] in no
 sense a 'primitive' money, but a sophisticated form
 of currency capable of adaptation to the particular
 needs of West African trade" (1970: 17). In addi-
 tion, other scholars have shown the east-west and
 north-south spread of the currency, and have spec-
 ulated on its diffusion from one part of the region
 to another. Nevertheless, there are certain issues
 that have not yet been adequately covered. Three
 such issues, which the present study seeks to ex-
 amine by focusing on the Yoruba of southwestern
 Nigeria, are the effects the introduction of a widely
 circulating currency had on the preexisting credit
 market; the impact of the monetization of economy
 on the society, particularly on the development of
 social classes; and the process of capital formation
 and accumulation through indigenous banking and
 credit institutions.
 For the records, the Yoruba people, on whom
 this study focuses, have been the subject of interest
 for many Africanists partly because of the level of
 their civilization which they had produced outside
 Hamito-Semitic and Arab-Islamic influence. They
 inhabit southwestern Nigeria, in present-day La-
 gos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, and Kwara states;
 and, as a result of European partition, they could
 also be found in the neighbouring Republics of
 Benin and Togo in West Africa. According to
 Samuel Johnson (1921: xix), this area lies, roughly
 speaking, between lat. 6° and 9° North, and long.
 2° 30' and 6° 30' East. Neither ethnically nor po-
 litically homogeneous, the people had been, from
 time immemorial, organized into many states or
 kingdoms. The total number of these kingdoms is
 unknown, but the major states include the Yagba,
 Ekiti, Igbomina, Ijesa,- Ife, and Ondo in the east;
 the Oyo, Egba, Owu, Egbado, and Ijebu in the
 center; and the Sabe, Ketu, Anago, Idaisa, Manigri,
 Isa, and Ana in the west. The ruling elites in most
 of the states claim descent from the Oduduwa
 house and/or Ile-Ife. Each state was independent
 and autonomous and had a monarchical system
 of government. They, however, shared common
 bonds of artistic and material culture, political
 and commercial ethics, and mutually intelligible
 language.
 Several features of Yoruba social and political
 systems supported the financial institutions. In an
 earlier publication, I have itemized these features
 1 Among others, see Lovejoy 1974; Latham 1971; Hopkins
 1966; Hiskett 1966; Jones 1958; Baier 1980: 25-35, 105-
 115; Herbert 1973.
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 as follows: "a centralised political and administra-
 tive system in each kingdom, where major policy
 decisions were taken by the oba (king) in coun-
 cil, and which, with a few exceptions, positively
 affected the conduct of economic programmes;
 a stratified society which, nevertheless, celebrated
 and rewarded success and hard work, particularly
 success in farming, trade and industry; an urban-
 ized social life which encouraged industrial pro-
 duction and promoted division of labour; a deep
 religious life, characterised by the worshipping of
 the Supreme God (Olodumare) through a pantheon
 of highly feared and respected gods and goddesses;
 and, closely associated with this, a well ordered
 society with laws believed to be binding on every
 member irrespective of his/her position, and with
 punishment believed to be handed down directly
 by the gods for every misdemeanor" (Adebayo
 1992: 164). Before their collapse and restructuring
 in the 19th century, these features of the social and
 political systems worked effectively to promote
 and protect investments and played a crucial role
 in the development of financial institutions.
 1. Money and Social Stratification
 in Yorubaland
 a) Yoruba Cowrie Currency
 Unlike many West African peoples, the Yoruba did
 not use metallic currency such as gold and silver
 coins before colonial rule.2 The main trade curren-
 cy was cowrie shells, cypraea moneta, imported
 from the Indian Ocean. The available evidence
 indicates that cowries came through two major
 routes: the northern route connecting Yorubaland
 with the caravan trade, and the southern route by
 way of the Atlantic coast. It is not clear from which
 of these routes cowries first came to the Yoruba
 country. The Portuguese were said to have found
 cowries in extensive use in Benin at the begin-
 ning of the 16th century (M. Johnson 1970: 18).
 Given the close historical and trade relationship
 between Benin on the one hand, and Ile-Ife and
 other parts of eastern Yorubaland on the other
 hand, the diffusion of cowries from the former to
 the latter can be reasonably assumed, a speculation
 further supported by the similarity in the cowrie
 numismatics of the Edo and Yoruba (M. Johnson
 1970: 41; Zaslavsky 1983: 125f.). According to
 S. A. Akintoye: "The earliest contacts of the Ekiti,
 Ijesa and Akoko with Beni  were commercial. It
 is generally believed that these earliest contacts
 ated back to the fifteenth century. Benin traders
 brought co als, European cloth, cowrie shells and
 European iron implements and, at a later date,
 guns and powder, and to k away home-spun cloth
 and camwood as well as beads and potash. . . .
 Akure was the entrepôt of this Benin trade and a
 considerable number of Edo people soon settled
 permanently at Akure" (1971: 25f.).
 The above c early indicate  that the eastern
 outes for the spread of cowries to Yorubaland
 were as important as the southern route through
 Ijebu country. On the othe  hand, cowries wer
 known to have been imported to the Western Su-
 dan centuri s before the Portuguese set out on their
 voyages, and b fore European traders began im-
 porting them (cowries) to the Atlantic west coast.
 They were known to be the currency in the Niger
 Bend countries and to have come there through
 the North African caravan trade of which the Oyo
Empire was a part. Thus, a northern route is al-
 so suggested. Indeed, earlier concerns to date the
 beginning of cowrie shells as a currency among
 the Yoruba have led to the suggestion that they
 were probably introduced about (but not later than)
 the fifteenth century (Oroge 1985: 75). Yorubaland
 combined the practices of stringing cowries (as
 was done in the Bights of Benin and Biafra) and
 of counting them individually (more prevalent in
 the western Sudan), which shows the diversity of
 monetary policies as well as sources of the cowrie
 shells.
 The participation of Yoruba traders in the At-
 lantic trade probably reduced the volume of cowrie
 importation by way of the northern (i.e., trans-Sa-
 haran) route from the 17th century onwards. It has
 been demonstrated how the slave trade increased
 the size of cowrie importation to West Africa; it
 has also been shown that several Yoruba states, in-
 cluding Ijebu, Egba, Egbado, and Old Oyo empire,
 took part in the slave trade (although there is still
 some controversy over the level of dependence of
 the political economy on this trade) (Law 1977).
 Trade relations between the Ijebu and the Portu-
 guese had been established as soon as the latter
 reached the Bight of Benin (Law 1973: 9-11).
 Although this trade was initially in other com-
 modities, slaves subsequently predominated. The
 exchange of cowries for slaves and the popularity
 of the shells as currency were soon to pitch the
 2 In the case of southwestern Nigeria, colonial rule came
 early with the conquest of Lagos in 1851, and British
 coins were in use along the coastal cities particularly by
 the returnees, traders, and missionaries. Despite this, coins
 were not in wide circulation. In the hinterland, according to
 Johnson, they were "regarded more or less as a curiosity."
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 Ijebu in commercial competition with their neigh-
 bours in the hinterland. Thus, Oyo expansion in the
 17th and 18th centuries towards the Atlantic coast
 was due to the interest of the business elite to,
 among other reasons, take control of the sources of
 money (cowries). This was also the main source of
 the rivalry between Oyo and Ijebu traders, which
 rivalry was interpreted in larger subethnic terms.
 As could be expected, the Ijebu, being closer to the
 Atlantic, dominated the trade in cowries until the
 Oyo opened their own port of trade at Badagry.
 Before the introduction of modern (European)
 currency, the Yoruba referred to cowries simply as
 money: owo. However, with the spread of British
 metallic currency in the 19th and 20th centuries,
 a distinction began to emerge between the old
 cowries and the new currency: the former was
 called owo eyo, meaning, literally, loose or numer-
 ated money; and the latter simply the Africanized
 names such as kobo for copper coins, sile for
 shillings, etc. As could be expected, the sources
 of cowries were shrouded in rituals and mystery.
 There are several variants of the myth, but gener-
 ally they reveal that Olodumare, the Yoruba high
 God, made cowries:
 They are living things with shells, small in size like snails. To
 obtain them, a hole was dug in the ground. When the hole has
 reached a certain depth, a sheep (with a rope tied around its
 neck) was thrown into it and buried alive. These living things
 would then crawl up the carcass of the sheep and stick to it.
 When there were many of them, the sheep would be brought
 out (with the help of the rope tied to its neck), and the living
 things sticking to its body would be removed, put into a pot
 which would be covered to make them die within a few days.
 After this, they would be taken to a river and would be washed
 very thoroughly to remove the decay of the cowries. The shells
 were then put into circulation as money.3
 The above could be interpreted in two major ways:
 (1) that the Yoruba "manufactured" their own cow-
 rie currency, and (2) that the business elite adopted
 this myth as a ploy to monopolize the informa-
 tion about the true sources of their wealth. Our
 position is a combination of the two possibilities.
 This is supported by the fact that, although there
 is only one dominant species of cowrie currency
 in Yorubaland (the cypraea moneta), which would
 suggest importation from the Maldive Islands rath-
 er than production from the Bight of Benin, there
 are certain other species of cowrie shells in lim-
 ited circulation which are similar to the type the
 Benin were using before the Atlantic trade, a fact
 that would also suggest internal production along
 the Atlantic coast of Yorubaland. Moreover, the
 average, lower class -person was discouraged from
 "looking for money" (wa owo, in Yoruba) because
 of the huge expenses involved in the above ritual,
 and this worked to limit the membership of the
 affluent upper class.
 Table 1: Yoruba ordinary and numismatic numerals (the first
 one hundred)
 Number Simple Cowrie Mathematics
 enumeration enumeration
 1 eni ookan 1
 2 eji eeji 2
 3 eta eeta 3
 4 erin eerin 4
 5 arun aarun 5
 6 efa eefa 6
 7 eje eeje 1
 8 ejo eejo 8
 9 esan eesan 9
 10 ewa eewa 10
 11 okanla ookanla 10+1
 12 e jila eejila 10+2
 13 étala eetala 10+3
 14 erinla eerinla 10+4
 15 edogun eedogun 20-5
 16 erindilogun eerindilogun 20-4
 17 etadilogun eetadilogun 20-3
 18 ejidilogun eejidilogun 20-2
 19 okandilogun ookandilogun 20-1
 20 ogun okowo 20
 21 okanlelogun ookanlelogun 20+1
 22 ejilelogun eejilelogun 20+2
 23 etalelogun eetalelogun 20+3
 24 erinlelogun eerinlelogun 20+4
 25 edogbon eedogbon 30-5
26 erindilogbon eerindilogbon 30-4
 27 etadilogbon eetadilogbon 30-3
 28 ejidilogbon eejidilogbon 30-2
 29 okandilogbon ookandilogbon 30-1
 30 ogbon ogbowo 30
 35 arundilogoji aarundilogoji 40-5 or
 (20x2)-5
 40 oji ogoji 20x2
 45 arundiladota aarundiladota [(20x3)-10]-5
 50 adota aadota (20x3)-10
 55 arundilogota aarundilogota (20x3)-5
 60 ogota ogota 20x3
 65 arundiladorin aarundiladorin [(20x4)-10]-5
 70 adorin aadorin (20x4)-10
 75 arundilogorin aarundilogorin (20x4)-5
 80 ogorin ogorin 20x4
 85 arundiladorun aarundiladorun [(20x5)-10]-5
 90 adorun aadorun (20x5)-10
 95 arundilogorun aarundilogorun (20x5 )-5
 100 ogorun ogorun 20x5
 Tables 1-3 show the Yoruba system of numis-
 matics. Like the Yoruba numeral on which it is
 based, the counting of cowries was a complex
 system involving extensive use of the mathemati-
 cal principles of addition, multiplication, and sub-
 traction. This system has attracted many West-
 3 Mrs. Misitura Yusuf, 90+, personal interview, Iwo, 16 De-
 cember, 1991.
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 em scholars who have found it intriguing that an
 illiterate society could develop such an intricate
 numeral system. This has led to some misunder-
 standing of the origin of the Yoruba numerals.
 Maria ne Schmidl is quoted to have speculated
 that "reckoning with the cowrie shells was basic
 in the construction of the number system" (in: Van
 Table 2: Yoruba numerals (some larger figures)
 Number Yoruba cowrie Mathematics
 enumeration
 110 aadofa (20x6)-10
 120 o gofa 20x6
 130 aadoje (20x7)-10
 140 ogoje 20x7
 150 aadojo (20x8)-10
 160 ogojo 20x8
 170 aadosan (20x9)-10
 180 ogosan 20x9
 190 ewadinnigba (20xl0)-10
 200 igbiwo 20x10
 210 ewalerugba (20xl0)+10
 220 ogunlugba (or okolugba) (20xl0)+20
 230 ogbonwolerugba (2OxlO)+3O
 240 ojilugba (or ojilerugba) (20xl0)+40
 250 aadotalerugba (20xl0)+(20x3)-10
 260 otalerugba (20xl0)+(20x3)
 270 aadorinlerugba (20xl0)+(20x4)-10
 280 orinlugba (20xl0)+(20x4)
 290 aadorunlerugba (20xl0)+(20x5)-10
 300 odunrun 20x(20-5)* or
 (20x20)-100**
 400 irinwo 20x20
 500 eedegbeta (200x3)-100
 600 egbeta 200x3
 700 eedegberin (200x4)-100
 800 egberin 200x4
 900 eedegberun (200x5)-100
 1 000 egberun 200x5
 1 100 eedegbefa (200x6)-100
 1 200 egbefa 200x6
 1 300 eedegbeje (200x7)-100
 1 400 egbeje 200x7
 2000 egbewa 200x10
 2400 egbejila 200x12
 2500 egbetala-din-ogorun (200xl3)-100
 3 500 egbejidinlogun-din-ogorun (200xl8)-100
 4000 egbaji 2000x2
 4 500 egbetalelogun-din-ogorun (200x23)-100
 5 000 egbedogbon 200x25
 5 500 egbetalelogbon-din-ogorun (200x33)-100
 6000 egbata 2000x3
 7 000 edegbarin (2 000x4)-l 000
 8 000 egbarin 2000x4
 9 000 edegbarun (2 000x5)-l 000
 10000 egbarun 2000x5
 20 000 egbaawa (or oke kan) 2 000x10
 30000 eedogun 2000x15
 40 000 egbagun (or oke meji) 20 000x2
 1 000 000 egbegberun 1 OOOx 1 000
 * Mathematical interpretation by Zaslavsky 1983: 122.
 ** More correct interpretation by S.Johnson 1921: lv.
 Table 3: Yoruba cowrie currencies (S. Johnson 1921: 118f.)
 40 cowries = 1 string
 50 strings = 1 head
 2 000 cowries = 1 head
 10 heads = 1 bag
 20 000 cowries = 1 bag
 Sertima 1983: 123). This is most unlikely; on the
 contrary, cowrie numeration was built upon the
 preexisting ordinary numerals. The most vivid de-
 scription of this numerals is still that of Samuel
 Johnson, and has been quoted extensively here:
 From one to ten, different terms are used, then for 20, 30,
 200, and 400; the rest are multiples or compounds. Thus 11,
 12, 13 and 14 are reckoned as ten plus one, plus two, plus three
 and plus four; 15 to 20 are reckoned as 20 less five, less four,
 less three, less two, less one, and then 20.
 In the same way we continue 20 and one, to 20 and four,
 and then 30 less five (25), less four, and so on to 30, and so
 for all figures reckoned by tens.
 There is no doubt that the digits form the basis of enumer-
 ation to a large extent, if not entirely so. Five, ten, twenty, i.e.,
 the digits of one hand, of two, and the toes included, and their
 multiples form the different stages of the enumeration.
 Beginning from the first multiple of 20 we have ogoji,
 a contraction of ogun meji, i.e. two twenties (40), ogota, three
 twenties (60), ogorin, four twenties (80), ogorun, five twenties
 (100), and so on to ten twenties (200), when the new word igba
 is used.
 The intermediate numbers (30 having a distinct terminolo-
 gy) 50, 70, 90, 110, 130 to 190 are reckoned as: 60 less ten
 (50), 80 less ten (70), a hundred less ten (90) and so on to 200.
 The figures from 200 to 2,000 are reckoned as multiples of
 200 (400, however, which is 20x20, the square of all the digits,
 has a distinct terminology, irinwo or erinwo, i.e. the elephant
 of figures - meaning the highest coined word in calculation,
 the rest being multiples).
 Thus we have egbeta, a contraction of igba-meta, i.e. three
 two-hundreds (600), egberin, from igba-merin, four two-hun-
 dreds (800), egberun, five two-hundreds (1,000), and so on to
 egbewa, ten two-hundreds (2,000), which in its turn forms the
 basis of still higher calculations.
 The intermediate figures of 300, 500, 700, 900, 1,100,
 to 1,900 are reckoned as 100 less the multiple above them,
 viz., odunrun, contracted from orun-din-ni-irinwo, i.e. 100 less
 than 400 (300), orun-din-ni egbeta, 100 less than 600 (500),
 orun-din-ni-egberin, 100 less than 800 (700); and so on to
 2,000.
 By a system of contraction, elision, and euphonic assimila-
 tion, for which the Yoruba language is characteristic, the long
 term orun-din-ni (egbeta, egberin and so on) is contracted to
 ede or ode, e.g., edegbeta (500), edegberin (700), edegberun
 (900) and so on.
 But the multiples of 200 do not end with ten times, although
 that figure is the basis of the higher calculations, it goes on to
 the perfection (or multiple) of the digits, viz.: twenty times (two
 hundred); thus we have egbokanla, that is igba mokanla, 11
 two-hundreds (2,200); egbejila, twelve two-hundreds (2,400),
 and so on to twenty two-hundreds or egbaji, that is, twice two
 thousand (4,000).
 With this ends the multiples of 200. The intermediate fig-
 ures of 2,300, 2,500, 2,700, 2,900 are reckoned the same way
 as before, viz.: 100 less than the next higher multiple.
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 As already mentioned, egbewa (or egbaa), 2,000, forms
 the basis of still higher calculations; the multiples of egbaa are
 egbaji, two two-thousands (4,000); egbata, three two-thousands
 (6,000); egbarin, four two-thousands (8,000) on to egbawa, ten
 two-thousands (20,000), which in its turn forms the basis of the
 highest calculations.
 The intermediate figures of 3,000, 5,000, 7,000, 9,000,
 11,000 onwards are reckoned as 1,000 less than the multiple
 above them. The more familiar terms for 3,000 and 5,000, how-
 ever are egbedogun, or fifteen two-hundreds, and egbedogbon,
 25 two-hundreds.
 For those figures beyond 20,000 the contracted forms which
 are generally used are okanla (for egbamokanla) 1 1 two-thou-
 sands (22,000); ejila, etala, on to egbagun, i.e., 20 two-thou-
 sands, i.e., forty-thousand.
 . . . Thus we see that with numbers that go by tens five is
 used as the intermediate figure - five less than the next higher
 stage. In those by 20, ten is used as the intermediate. In those
 by 200, 100 is used, and in those of 2,000, 1,000 is used.
 The figure that is made use of for calculating indefinite
 numbers is 20,000 egbawa, and in money calculation especially
 it is termed oke kan, i.e., one bag (of cowries). Large numbers
 to an indefinite amount are so many "bags" or rather "bags" in
 so many places (S. Johnson 1921: liv-lv).
 Like all forms of money, the value of cowrie
 shells was not stable. Aside from the late 19th cen-
 tury inflation which has been discussed by A. G.
 Hopkins and Marion Johnson, the value of the
 currency increased in direct relation to its scar-
 city; thus, it had a higher value in the hinterland
 than along the coast. Table 3 shows the range of
 value of cowrie shells relative to the contemporary
 British currency in the mid- 19th century. Even this
 was not stable. A.G. Hopkins (1966: 474f., 477)
 has summarized how the value fluctuated widely
 in the period thus:
 The steepest fall was during the first stage, from 1851 to 1865,
 when the value of one head of cowries (2000 K) dropped from
 4s. 9d. to Is. 3d., as a result of the increased shipment made
 by the competing German and French firms. During the second
 stage, from 1865 to 1879 (and to 1883, in the case of Badagli),
 the value of the cowrie fell from Is. 3d. to Is. per head. This
 period of relative stability may be explained by the tendency
 for net imports of cowrie to fall; by an upward movement in
 demand for cowries following the general expansion of trade
 in the period after the creation of the Colony of Lagos in 1861;
 and ... as a side effect of speculation in the dollar. The third
 stage, from about 1880 (or 1884 in the case of Badagli) to
 about 1895, was a period of renewed upheaval and fluctuating
 exchange rates, during which the value of one head of cowries
 dropped from Is. Od. to 6d
 not caused by over-issue, for the import of cowries continued
 to decrease, but were primarily the result of other monetary
 innovations, namely the demonetization of the dollar and the
 introduction of British silver coin, both of which had adverse
 effects on the value of the already depreciated cowrie currency.
 By the end of the 19th century, the value of cowrie
 shells in Yorubaland had dropped to what became
 known as the "standard" of calculation in relation
 to British currency then being gradually introduced
 into the hinterland. According to Samuel Johnson
 (1921: 119), "the rate of exchange became practi-
 cally fixed at 6d. for a 'head' . . . i.e. 2,000 cowries;
 hence 3d. = 1,000 cowries." However, because
 copper money was regarded as being inferior in
 value, one penny (minted in copper, and called
 kobo in Yoruba) was reckoned at 300 cowries each.
 Thus, 3d. in copper money would be 900 cowries
 rather than 1,000. Bigger figures were based on
 the 2,000 cowries (egbewa) to 6d; thus, 5s. was
 20,000 cowries (oke kan) and one British pound
 was 80,000 cowries (oke merin).
 Cowrie shells were in great use in the internal
 and international commerce of Yorubaland. Never-
 theless, not all transactions reached the market as
 nonmonetary exchanges were as valid as buying
 and selling with cowrie shells as the unit of ac-
 count. It would seem that one "bag" of cowries
 was a lot of money. According to oral information,
 a farmer in the 19th century had to be really big
 to earn as much as one "bag" of cowries (approxi-
 mately 5s.) in a single harvest season; and a trader
 could begin a successful venture and participate
 in long-distance (caravan) trade with one "bag" of
 cowries.4 Because of the bulk and weight of the
 shells (see M. Johnson 1970: 24-32), and because
 the presence of tse-tse fly in Yorubaland prevented
 the use of animals (especially donkey and camel)
 as beasts of burden, long-distance traders used to
 engage head porters whose only duty was to carry
 money from one market to another. Because of the
 dangers of highwaymen, traders did not transport
 the money so conspicuously. According to oral
 information from those who were still engaged in
 the caravan trade early in this century, the cowries
 were usually put in a sack, and the sack placed in
 a wide-brimmed calabash for easy carrying on the
 head. In this way, too, no one could differentiate
 a load of cowries from a load of goods. In any
 case, protection was offered, even in periods of
 interethnic warfare, because most traders in those
 days were also warriors and/or had armed guards.
 b) Community, Political Power, and Class
 We are not unfamiliar with the debate on whether
 traditional African soci ties were communal or had
 classes, and at what stage the historic transition
 from the former to the latter took place. One les-
 son that has come out of this debate, and more
 importantly out of the current crisis in African so-
 cialist and radical literatur , is the need to develop
 4 Oral interviews at Iwo and Ilesa. Persons interviewed had
 been traders and farmers when they were young.
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 a workable theory of class structure and gender
 relations capable of capturing the distinctively Af-
 rican content and context.
 Social stratification would seem to have started
 very early in Yorubaland, and to have passed
 through different phases at different times in the
 various states and kingdoms. In the early phases,
 classes were based on access to and possession
 of political power. There were distinctions based
 on economic pursuits as well. Although there was
 some variation from state to state, the general
 structure was similar. Class was better developed
 among the Yoruba of Oyo, who built the Old Oyo
 empire, and Ife, the famed cradle of mankind.
 The earliest reference to social stratification
 among the Yoruba is the study of social status in
 the Ife kingdom by William Bascom (1951). In this
 sociological study which, despite its importance,
 does not clearly differentiate between the pre-
 and post-monetization eras of Yoruba economic
 history, Bascom reaffirms that the Yoruba "have
 a complex and highly stratified social structure."
 Continuing in the same vein, he further asserts
 that "rank depends upon a series of factors . . .
 including wegjth, sex, his station as free or slave,
 his relative age or seniority, the rank of the clan
 into which he is born, the political or religious
 office which he achieves or inherits, and the social
 position of his relatives, friends or associates."
 (1951: 491). In other words, the Yoruba today
 practise a complex system of social stratification
 in which ascription and achievement are intricately
 balanced. This was not the way it had always been:
 these were the results of changes and transforma-
 tions, in turn resulting from the increasing variega-
 tion of society particularly since the introduction
 of money. Given the position of Ile-Ife in Yoruba
 history and social development, it is appropriate
 to begin this examination of pre-cowrie system of
 social stratification from that ancient city.
 Bascom has identified nine strata of social
 structure in Ife society (1951: 498). On further
 analysis we find that these can be collapsed into
 six main classes as follows:
 1) the king (Oni) and the princely families;
 2) the Modewa clans from which the palace chiefs
 are chosen, and the Ife clans from which the
 town chiefs are chosen;
 3) the priests and their families/clans;
 4) the freeborn or Ife towns-people;
 5) the palace officials, slaves, messengers, and oth-
 er functionaries;
 6) strangers, of two categories: Yoruba from other
 parts (elu), and non- Yoruba tribes-people (kog-
 bede) such as Hausa, Edo, or Igbo.
 In theory, vertical mobility was allowed among
 members of the lower classes; somehow even
 slaves, after manumission, could rise to important
 positions; but this was not expected among mem-
 bers of the first two classes. In practice, however,
 conomic requirements for mobility were quite
 great, and often beyond the reach of the freeborn
 as well as slaves (Bascom 1951: 499-501). The Ife
 example is replicated in other parts of Yorubaland,
 for example, in Old Oyo. According to I. A. Akin-
 jogbin (1986: 274), Oyo was a highly structured
 society, "with about five principal classes which
 were again internally divided into sub-classes."
 These were, in descending order of power and
 influence in Oyo society:
 1) akeyo: the princes, from whom the alaafin was
 selected;
 2) ijoye: the chiefly families, of which the oyomesi
 were the most powerful;
 3) orno ilu: the freeborn, "whose families owned
 land but were neither chiefly nor princely";
 4) eru: the slaves, among whom were the palace
 slaves who were even more powerful politically
 than the freeborn;
 5) ara oko: literally "bush men," a category into
 which were lumped all those who lived outside
 of metropolitan Oyo.
 The above was true for most parts of Yoruba-
 land that had come under Oyo influence. Perhaps,
 we should start with the last category, the ara
 oko, which arose out of the Oyo cultural arrogance
 and political imperialism over virtually the rest of
 Yorubaland. The ara oko phenomenon could be
 likened to the "stranger" category in Ife: the elu
 and the kogbede who were looked down upon and
 oppressed. It could also be likened to the distinc-
 tion in the ancient Roman Empire between holders
 of Roman or Latin citizenship, on the one hand,
 and the barbarians, on the other hand. According to
 Akinjogbin, anyone who was not a resident of Old
 Oyo, or was not an Oyo Yoruba, was credited with
 less intelligence and civilization than, and certainly
 looked upon with disdain by, the lowliest slave in
 the metropolis. It did not matter if such an ara
 oko was a king, prince, or chief in his own state:
 the bottom line was the ability to speak the Oyo
 dialect and imbibe Oyo culture. The Oyo had many
 statements that portrayed the contempt they had for
 the ara oko. Two examples will suffice here:
 Aifini-p'eni, aif eniyan-p' eniyan ni i mu ara oko san bante
 wolu.
 "It is out of total disrespect for (Oyo) humanity and civilization
 that a 'bush man' comes to town improperly clothed."
 Ohun ti ara oko ba se ti o ba dará, eesi Yo se.
 "The 'bush man' cannot do anything right, except accidentally."
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 And as in imperial Rome, once the ara oko had im-
 bibed the Oyo culture, and if he/she was not orig-
 inally a slave, he/she was given Oyo citizenship,
 promoted to the class of the freeborn, and accorded
 the benefits and privileges of an Oyo citizen.
 The other four classes were, to a large extent,
 very rigid. Membership of the first two especially
 was by ascription. In Oyo, the princely class com-
 prised the king, the alaafin, his aremo (firstborn or
 heir apparent who, until the great changes of the
 19th century, did not actually succeed his father),
 his other children, the children of previous alaafin,
 and the king's wives. Although most public func-
 tions were performed by men (princes), women
 were given important roles among the princely
 class. In particular, the olori, the king's favourite
 wife, had immense political clout. In Ondo, there
 was the office of the Queen Mother which was a
 very important position. Slight variations occurred
 in other Yoruba states, but the princely class was
 basically the more important arm of the ruling
 elite. The other arm was the chiefly class, the
 ijoye, made up of civil and military chiefs. These
 were the king makers and advisers, and in their
 respective quarters and compounds they adjudi-
 cated in minor disputes. Among the Oyo, the most
 important chiefs were the oyomesi made up of sev-
 en chiefs who, in full council, had the power to de-
 pose an alaafin who, in their opinion, had violated
 the constitution. Again, although men occupied the
 most important chieftaincy titles, women members
 of the chiefly class were well respected. Indeed,
 depending on the personality of its occupant, the
 office of iyalode, head of women's affairs and of
 the market, was as important and powerful as any
 other office in the state. Membership of the chief-
 ly and princely classes was determined by birth:
 children of chiefs could not aspire to be kings.
 So much has been written about indigenous
 slavery in Africa.5 It is, however, necessary to
 reiterate that there was a distinction in Yoruba-
 land between the palace slaves (eru oba) and
 slaves owned by other members of the community.
 Whereas the former had enormous privileges and
 exercised greater political power than some chiefs,
 than most freeborn, and than all ara oko, the latter
 enjoyed little legal protection and, in the age of the
 Atlantic slave trade, could be sold at the slightest
 pretext. Despite the influence of the palace slaves,
 however, slave status was not cherished by the
 poorest freeborn. Indeed, the freeborn (orno ilu)
 was a large class into which the rich and the poor
 were lumped. Most were engaged in agriculture,
 particularly in the production of food crops, but
 th  professional group was already being enlarged
 by the 16th century. This professional group was
 composed of traders and manufacturers and crafts-
 men such as sculptors and other artists, weavers,
dyers, tailors, smiths, etc., who pursued their busi-
 esses on a full-time basis. There was also a grow-
 ing subclass of entertainers, including musicians
 (onilu, olorin, or akorin), traveling theaters (eegun
 alare), magicians (apidan or opidan), and poets
 (akewi or asunrara) who gave public performances
 for all members of the society, both rich and poor.
 Despite its rigidity, the system allowed for some
 movement across the classes, especially between
 the two lower classes. Akinjogbin (1986: 276) has
 offered the following description of the movement
 b tween the classes: "A slave could purchase his
 freedom and become a freeman. But through the
 orile assigned to him his descendants would for-
 ever be remembered as an offspring of slaves. A
 female free citizen could marry into a princely
 family or chiefly class and her descendants would
 become centers of influence for their cousins of
 the lower classes. A princess could marry a free
 citizen, but she could not thereby be controlled by
 her husband. She was free to move out anytime she
 chose or have other lovers without moving out of
 her marital home. She might, however, choose to
 remain faithful to the husband and have children
 for him. Such issues, if they became successful
 later in life, could become princes and contest a
 vacancy on the throne."
 The relationship that existed between the clas-
 s s was dynamic. For the most part, the different
 classes were dependent one on the other. However,
 as society became more complex and variegated,
 elements of intra- and inter-class conflict, and the
 oppression of the lower by the upper classes, be-
 gan to be introduced. Moreover, the solidarity that
 used to exist between the princely and the chief-
 ly classes began to break down. Although most
 Yoruba kingdoms went through this transition, it
 was more severe and had more disastrous political
 consequences in the Old Oyo Empire.
 Oyo' s imperial expansion between the 16th and
 18th centuries had been achieved by the coopera-
 tion of all the classes; thereafter, members of the
ruling classes (the princes and chiefs) sought not
 only to preside over the exploitation of the imperial
 economy but also to exclude members of the lower
 classes from the spoil. The sharing of the booty
 also drove a wedge into the solidarity that used to
 exist among the princes and chiefs. A long squab-
 5 See, among the more recent works, Lovejoy 1982 and 1981;
 Inikori 1982; with reference to slavery in Yorubaland, see
 Oroge 1971.
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 ble arose over, among other issues, who was to
 control the economic advantages of imperial con-
 quest. Generally regarded as the "Gaha's atroci-
 ties" (S. Johnson 1921: 178-187), this squabble is
 better appreciated as an intra-class struggle for the
 economic ascendancy of Oyo chiefs than as mere
 political trouble within metropolitan Oyo caused
 by basorun Gaha. It was clear that Gaha was not
 simply pursuing a personal ambition, but that of
 his class. According to Samuel Johnson, "Gaha
 had a great influence with the people, and a great
 many followers who considered themselves safe
 under his protection" (1921: 178). It see ed at first
 that the alaafin and the princes lacked the power
 to deal with the conspiracy; for, between 1735
 and 1770, the basorun (in conspiracy with the
 chiefs) successfully forced four alaafin to commit
 suicide. In the same period, the basorun sent his
 own agents to the provinces to collect the annual
 taxes and tributes. As the years wore on, cracks
 began to show in the ranks of the chiefs. Possibly
 because Gaha had become too greedy (he was said
 to have refused to share the booty and tributes
 equally among the oyomesi), and partly because
 the military was tired of arbitrary orders from
 the basorun, the are-ona-kakanfo (Field Marshall)
 Oyabi cha ged sides and gave alaafin Abiodun
 military support to overcome the Gaha conspiracy
 in 1774. Abiodun's triumph was also victory for
 his class: in a bloodbath, he eliminated all pockets
 of opposition to the princes. However, since the
 conspirators were brave and experienced members
 of the armed force, the purge was counterproduc-
 tive by rendering the Oyo army weak.6
 Members of the lower classes bore the brunt of
 this intra-class struggle. The cruelty they suffered
 from the contending parties could only be imag-
 ined. They no longer had access to justice or
 even "common decent treatment." Samuel Johnson
 (1921: 168-182) provides a long list of abuses
 which the freeborn suffered from those who were
 supposed to be their protectors.7 If the citizens
 were subjected to so much cruelty, how much
 worse would the slaves and ara oko suffer! It was
 in this era that many sl ves were sold into the
 Atlantic system. Commoners' wives and property
 were appropriated openly, and young women were
 debauched at puberty. A prince who decided to
travel at night "could order whole villages on his
 path to be set on fire (the roofs were made of grass
 thatch) just so that he could see clearly" (Akinjog-
 bin 1986: 279). Any member of the ruling elite
 could go to the countryside and impose himself
 on the people.
 Oyo might be an extreme, but not an unusual
 case of the coarseness of life in 18th century Yoru-
 baland. Indeed, t e crisis in the social stratification
 produced far reaching consequences for a large
 part of the ountry. In particular, the oppressed
 classes of Oyo long remembered and re ented any
 form of monarchical oppression when they had
 the opportunity to create a new society in the
 mid- 19th century. According to Akinjogbin (1986:
 281), "[T]he Oyo survivors w o seized political
 power in Ibadan around 1832 completely rejected
 any form of m narchical government or any kind
 of class division based on birth or families in
 their new settlement. Ins ead they opted for an
 open society where merit and ability would be
 the passport to leadership. That kind of decision
 coming from Oyo refugees must be striking for had
 they liked their former system, nothing would have
 been easier for them than to replicate it in their
 new home, as they had descendants of kings and
 chiefs among the settlers in Ibadan in the 1830's."
 So much space has been devoted to the Oyo
 social stratification because changes in it had great
 6 This was not the end of the rivalry and contest between the
 princes and the chiefs. Later in the 19th century, Afonja,
 the are-ona-kakanfo, also rebelled against the imperial class
 and made a league with the new Fulani power at llorín. This
 rebellion actually precipitated the fall of the empire.
 7 Two examples will suffice here, one each representative of
 the cruelty of the alaafin and Gaha's children respectively:
 "[alaafin Ay ibi] was one day in his bath, being attended by
 one of his favourite wives; and she, in a moment of self-
 forgetfulness (or rather of amorous regard) said jocularly to
 him, 'And this is all of the man so much dreaded by all!' He
 took offence at this remark, but disguised his displeasure
 by a smile, but inwardly he was determined to convince
 her practically of the power which made him an object of
 dread to all. After leaving his bathroom, he gave an order
 to a Tetu (executioner) privately to fetch the heads of the
 wife's father and mother each in a calabash, and decently
 covered up. This order was promptly executed. The wife
 had by this time forgotten her remarks in the bathroom
 The calabashes being brought and set before him, he sent
 for her from her apartment, and asked her to uncover
 those calabashes and tell the contents of them! 'Do you
know them?' asked he, 'Yes I do,' she replied trembling.
 'Then,' rejoined he 'that is the secret why I am so much
 dreaded by all, although to you I seem but commonplace
 and ordinary' " (172). "Gaha's sons were as ambitious and
 as cruel as their father. . . . One of them once engaged a
 carrier to whom he gave a load too heavy for him to carry,
 but he dared not refuse to do so. He walked behind the man
 amusing himself with the sight of the man's sufferings from
 the weight of the load. He remarked in jest that the man's
 neck had become so thick that he doubted whether a sword
could cut through. He suited his action to his words, drew
 his sword, and actually tried it! The man was decapitated,
 and his body was left wallowing in his blood, and another
 man was compelled to take up the load" (180f.).
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 and lasting impact on other parts of Yorubaland.
 As we have shown, the changes also affected the
 dispersal of Yoruba people to other parts of the
 world through the increase in the volume of vic-
 tims of the wars sold into the Atlantic slave trade.
 At this stage, the question can be posed: What was
 the impact of money on this social structure?
 c) Rich and Poor: Money and Changes
 in Social Stratification
 Money, people say, is the root of all evils. The
 monetization of Yoruba economy brought its own
 evils. In this section, evidence will be presented
 to show that the Yoruba society, like many pre-
 colonial African societies, had moved away from
 the old communal system into a strictly ordered
 system based on access to, and possession of mon-
 ey and property before the coming of colonial
 rule. Owing largely to the increasing reliance on
 the market, there developed a clear distinction
 between those who had money and those who
 did not. In place of the earlier division based on
 birth, the new classes placed great emphasis on
 success and achievement. By the end of the 19th
 century, the society had become differentiated into
 two basic classes: the rich, olowo, and the poor,
 otosi or talaka.
 The second part of this paper is devoted to the
 various ways money was earned and the process of
 accumulation in Yorubaland. In the rest of this part,
 therefore, our attention will be focused on the im-
 pact of money and monetization on the preexisting
 social structure. Firstly, who were the rich, from
 among which classes did they emerge, and what
 were the social and political obligations imposed
 on them by the society? In general, the rich were
 of two categories: the "old" and the "new" elite.
 The old elite, i.e., members of the ruling aris-
 tocratic class, including the kings, princes, town
 and quarter chiefs, and military leaders, employed
 their position (their access to land, labour, and
 inheritance) to corner cowrie currency, the new
 source of wealth. Whatever the merits of Yoruba
 land tenure, the fact remains that members of the
 ruling elite, particularly the kings or village heads,
 derived a lot of wealth from their role as guardians
 of the family and tribal lands. The statement oba
 lo ri ile, meaning "the land belongs to the king," is
 not an empty proverb. In theory, and as writings on
 Yoruba land law have shown (e.g., Lloyd 1962),
 land belongs to the entire community or tribe, and
 members of the tribe have no difficulty in obtain-
 ing land for agricultural and residential purposes.
 In theory, too, the land is held in trust for the
 people by the king, and, until the promulgation of
 the Nigerian Land Use and Allocation Decree of
 1977,8 he had the power to allocate parcels of the
 land, "including forests and the plain," to outsiders
 for life. In practice, members of the ethnic group
 or community, as well as outsiders, were to pay a
 part of the annual yield on the farm as tribute,
 known in most parts of Yorubaland as isakole.
 This tribute was not exactly a land tax, but it
 subsequently formed the basis of accumulation by
 the ruling elite.9 It was not unusual for some kings
 to fix the proportion of the yield payable as isakole,
 the food crops were consumed in the palace while
 the surplus was sold. For members of the ruling
 elite, therefore, the process of cowrie accumulation
 rested on the tapping of the isakole system.
 In addition to the collection of this internally
 generated isakole, the old elite also became rich
 from their exploitation of the vassal states. This
 was especially true of rulers of kingdoms with
 imperial status, such as Ife, Oyo, Ijesa, Ibadan,
 ll rín, and Egba. The elite in these kingdoms
collected annual tributes from the provinces and
 vassal states, in addition to the spoils of war at
 first conquest. Originally, these tributes were paid
 in kind (in food crops as were the isakole) but sur-
 pluses were sold to generate cash. As the economy
 became increasingly monetized, kings and chiefs
 b gan to collect cowries in addition to food crops.
This, at least, was the case in Oyo empire in the
 age of alaafin Abiodun who was remembered in
 the traditions as a very rich trader. Before that,
 it was also the case during the era of basorun
 Gaha who received presents in cowries as well as
 building materials from vassals upon the occasion
 of the fire that razed down his house (S. Johnson
 1921: 182f.). In essence, tributes constituted one of
 the main sources of wealth, and provided the initial
 capital which could be (and certainly was) invested
 to generate more wealth (for more details, see
 Law 1978). Thus, rather than displace members
 8 For a short but useful analysis of the impact of the Land
 Use Decree on traditional land tenure, see Fabiyi 1979.
 9 To this must be added the various other means of accu-
 mulation open to the kings of Yorubaland, such as outright
 appropriation of the property of the people. Kings sent their
 messengers to the market at any time to rake from the wares
 brought there for sale, and the unlucky trader could do
 nothing about it. Some instances existed of the oba appro-
 priating even the common man's wife. Such appropriations
 did not constitute a real threat unless it became too frequent.
 In addition, town and palace chiefs could extract the free
 labour of the common people. For further information, see
 S. Johnson 1921; also Bascom 1951: 502f.
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 of the old aristocracy, cowries actually promoted
 the transformation of their economic status.10
 Moreover, cowrie currency boosted the eco-
 nomic importance of coastal states, such as the
 Popo, Egba, Egbado, and Ijebu who became mid-
 dlemen in the trade between the Europeans and
 the Yoruba, which trade brought cowrie shells in
 exchange for slaves and legitimate goods. In oth-
 er words, money promoted the advance of these
 coastal states and gave them greater capacity for
 competition with their counterparts in the hinter-
 land. A major evidence in this regard was the Popo
 king, Elewi-odo, who visited Oyo in the days of
 basorun Gaha. Elewi-odo was a friend of the alaa-
 fin Agboluaje, and he was reputed to be very rich
 because he was nearer the coast and was trading
 with the Europeans (S. Johnson 1921: 179).
 On the other hand, a new propertied class
 emerged among the freeborn in the lower classes.
 As will be shown below, opportunities existed in
 certain situations in precolonial Yorubaland for an
 individual in the lower classes (except the slaves)
 to have upward mobility. This could be achieved
 through excellence in farming, trading, or man-
 ufacturing. The Yoruba put everything to ori or
 ayanmo, luck or destiny; not necessarily ogbon
 or agbara, wisdom or hard work.11 To be rich,
 a lower class person might be asked to perform
 a number of sacrifices, to literally "wash his/her
 head," to bring him/her good luck. Riches might
 still elude him/her, despite the sacrifice, if his/her
 ayanmo (destiny) was to be poor. Of the different
 occupations/professions, trading and warfare pro-
 vided the best avenue for upward mobility among
 members of the lower classes.
 It is not possible to date the origin of the "nou-
 veau riches" in Yorubaland. What is certain from
 the evidence available is the fact that the devel-
 opment was a gradual process which occurred at
 different times in the various kingdoms. And their
 emergence raised questions of the political role to
 be assigned to them. The most common approach
 to the issue, at least in the 19th century when
 we have conclusive evidence, was their incorpora-
 tion into the political process by their investment
 with honorary, sometimes traditional, but often
 nonhereditary chieftaincy titles. There can be no
 doubt that this practice had begun quite earlier, its
 forerunner being the military practice of promot-
 ing brave soldiers into commanding positions and
 earning such titles as balogun nd jagun. The most
 common of these nonhereditary, civilian titles con-
 ferred on the "nouveau riches" was usually in the
 area of military and trading, as head or assistant
 head o  a detachment of the kingdom's army, or
 of a guild of traders. The latter would account for
 the proliferation of the title of par akoy i (male head
 of traders) or iyalaje12 (female head of traders) in
 many parts of Yorubaland.
 It is in the area of societal expectations that
 the differences between the old and new men and
 women of wealth become apparent. Money was
 important, but in the strict ordered society of the
 Yoruba it was never a substitute for being born
 into, or descended from a titled class. At least, this
 was the way the old aristocracy sought to preserve
 their political status. Members of the new aristoc-
 racy or "nouveau riche" were incorporated into the
 political system, might be dining and wining with
 the kings and princes, but they had (and knew)
 their limits. No matter how wealthy, they were
 not to be insolent to members of the titled nobility
 even though the latter might not be as rich.
 Beyond the above limitation, all members of
 the upper classes were obliged to perform certain
 duties for the benefit of their society. They were
 expected to provide good leadership at peace or
 war time, and upon them rested the patronage of
 the arts. They engaged the praise singers, poets,
 and drummers; carvers and sculptors; tailors and
 embroiderers; builders and palm wine tappers. In
 all these, personal appearance was considered to be
 of great importance. Everyone expected the rich to
 dress well, and their king to be better dressed than
 any other individual. Thus, to return to the story of
 Elewi-odo on his state visit to Oyo, the Oyo people
 expected the alaafin to be better dressed than his
 friend. According to the narrative as recorded by
 Samuel Johnson, "as often as the King (Alaafin)
 changed his robes, he (Elewi-odo) changed his
 covering cloth to the one of the same material."
 At this,
 ... the citizens of Oyo grew jealous for the honour and glory of
 their King and wished him to appear superior to the Elewi-odo
 by robing himself with something the like of which even the
 Elewi had not
 10 This is not to deny that, in certain situations, some members
 of the old aristocracy who had insufficient money were
 unable to maintain a style of life befitting of an aristocrat.
 Many of them also went into debt.
 1 1 This philosophy served to console those who never made
 it rich, despite their striving; and to caution the rich from
 regarding the poor as lazy. The intention was not to make
 everyone complacent.
12 Note the root words here: iya (mother) I' Aje (of Aje). Aje is
 the Yoruba goddess of commerce, and apparently a woman
 wh  has made it rich is said to have related to Aje in a
 very cordial ma ner. For more information on this goddess
 of commerce, and on sociological interpretations of other
 Yoruba gods and goddesses, see Belasco 1980: 140-165.
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 the case put before them, and they promised to rise to the
 occasion. A simple gown was thereupon woven, of common
 stuff indeed, but embossed all over with the silken wool of the
 large cotton tree; seen at a distance the nature of the cloth could
 not be made out by the crowd; when the sun shone upon it, it
 reflected a silken hue to the admiration of all; when the breeze
 blew, detached flosses of silk floated all around his majesty. . . .
 The crowd went into an ecstatic frenzy about it, and shouted
 an applause (S. Johnson 1921: 179).
 The import of the above is that, to a large extent,
 whereas the Yoruba people supported the idea that
 the rich should conform to a certain standard of
 living, there was a certain restriction to how wealth
 should be flaunted.
 The foregoing leads us to examine Bascom's
 division of the upper class into six different strata
 as follows:
 1. The wealthy man (oloro), who has the greatest
 amount of property
 2. The rich man (olola) or man of money (olowo)
 3. The man of principle (enia pataki)
 4. The gentleman (gbajumo)
 5. The lucky man (olor i rere)
 6. The good hearted man (oninu rere) (1951:
 503f.).
 Although Bascom conceives the above classifica-
 tion within the context of Ife society, it is actu-
 ally applicable to several Yoruba kingdoms and
 societies. The point to note is that monetization
 increased the membership of the upper classes,
 although the door was not thrown wide open for
 members of the lower classes. There were various
 restrictions consciously or unconsciously imposed
 on the common people. They had no access to
 vital information on the most lucrative economic
 activities. Where they did, their movement was
 restricted by the general insecurity resulting from
 slave trading by members of the upper classes.
 (Indeed, a huge proportion of the freeborn were
 made captives and sold into the Atlantic trade.)
 At the same time, money reinforced the in-
 equality among members of the ruling class. The
 most important groups were the first two strata, the
 oloro and olowo. It is also interesting to note that
 the positions are interchangeable: to be olowo, the
 oloro could sell some of his/her property, including
 slaves, clothes, farm crops, ornaments, and, more
 recently, land; to become oloro an olowo only has
 to invest his money on any or all items of property
 that appeal to him/her. Of the other four strata,
 the gentleman (gbajumo) deserves a brief mention.
 Gbajumo is from igba oju mo, meaning literally a
 person known by about two hundred eyes. Such a
 person was actually popular enough to have been
 well acquainted with people beyond his village or
 compound in the city. It was also assumed that the
 several "eyes" were not those of ordinary people
 but chiefs and princes. The gbajumo were men and
 women of ideas, and they promoted those ideas
 with their money: always on hand at important
 occasions, always ready to spend a few cowries on
 praise singers, always called upon to be spokesper-
 son for the family or town, etc. The possession of
 money (cowries) certainly made life worth living
 for members of the upper classes whether they
 belonged to the old aristocracy or the new.
 On the other hand, the want of money made
 life difficult for members of the lower classes. The
 poor, otosi or talaka (from Hausa talakawa), were,
 to say the least, dependent on the rich either as
 slaves or as clients. As society became monetized
 and more complex, the exploitation of the slaves
 increased. Many Yoruba were sold into the At-
 lantic slave trade at different times, and members
 of the upper classes dominated this trade. Indeed,
 several alaafin of Oyo participated in the trade.
 The ones who suffered most from incessant raids
 for captives were the members of the lower classes
 who resided in the villages or in the least defended
 parts of the cities. It was also among the lower
 classes that the rank and file of the armies were
 conscripted. Although this might be an avenue for
 upward mobility for some, for a majority of them
 it was the route to capture and enslavement. When
 the slave trade came under attack in the latter
 part of the 19th century, the elites put the slaves
 already acquired to use in the farms and other
 occupations. The situation in Ibadan in the 19th
 century best proves this point. Toyin Falola (1984:
 27f.) has revealed that Ibadan chiefs and aristocrats
 established slave villages or plantations where the
 labour and the person of the slaves were exploited
 to the fullest degree possible. Emancipation did
 not come to Yoruba slaves in the 19th century, nor
 in the period immediately after the establishment
 of colonial rule, for reasons of the dependence of
 production and capital accumulation on the exploi-
 tation of domestic slaves.
 Next to the slaves in the lower class were the
 iwofa whose emergence could be dated to the
 increased monetization of the economy and the
 development of the credit system. As I have dem-
 onstrated elsewhere (Adebayo 1992), the labour
 and services of the iwofa represented the interest
 on borrowed money. The value of this interest
 cannot be adequately quantified: it increased in
 direct proportion to the length of service, the sex
 and age of the person performing the service (the
 iwofa), and the conduct of the moneylender. There
 is no doubt, nevertheless, that it was exploitative
 and limited the chances of the debtor to repay the
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 principal (which payment terminated the service
 or interest).
 The dependence and poverty of the freeborn
 reached greater proportions as a result of moneti-
 zation. In theory, the poor members of a family had
 access to the wealth of other members through the
 extended family system. Their two basic needs -
 feeding and accommodation - were often assured
 in the big house of the wealthy member. On the
 other hand, this very facility imposed on them cer-
 tain dependence on, and responsibilities to the rich;
 an issue that nurtured the patron-client relationship
 between the freeborn and the rich. This point has
 been proved vividly in my earlier writing (1992).
 It should suffice here to note that the extended
 family system cushioned the degree of exploitation
 but did not remove it entirely. Indeed, the system
 worked in favour of the rich more than has been
 admitted in the literature: it kept down the poor
 and made them complacent, prevented them from
 identifying their patrons properly as their oppres-
 sors and rising against them, and preserved the
 class structure in favour of the dominant elites.
 By way of summarizing the discussion, two
 points are worth emphasizing here; one old, the
 other revisionist. Firstly, the Yoruba example has
 reinforced the point that African societies had
 currencies that performed the same functions as
 modern currency. The cowrie currency of old was
 satisfactory as medium of exchange over a wide
 trade area, and the analysis in this part has shown
 that cowries revolutionized the numeration system
 in Yorubaland. Secondly, precolonial Africa was
 not the haven that some romantic scholars would
 have us believe: monetization of the economy had
 begun before European contact, and had produced
 a class society as variegated and as dynamic as
 any other.
 2. Yoruba Savings, Credit, and Banking
 Institutions
 Traditional savings, credit, and banking institu-
 tions in Africa have not received the kind of at-
 tention they deserve; but for the interest of soci-
 ologists and economic anthropologists, the subject
 could be described as neglected. Writings on rural
 or traditional economy often lament the poverty of
 preindustrial credit systems in Africa, but no effort
 has been made to assess the degree of this pover-
 ty; those on banking and finance in colonial and
 postcolonial Africa avoid dealing with traditional
 financial institutions under the pretext that they
 were, strictly speaking, not banks. Indeed, these
 studies popularized the myth that Africans actually
 did not produce surplus wealth worth saving, and
 the little that was produced by quite a handful of
 the people was kept (as distinct from saved) in
 pots and buried in the ground, thus putting the
 money away from any possibility of its being put
 to immediate economic use by others. The more
 sympathetic general works on African economic
 history often treat traditional savings and credit
 institutions as mere footnotes. Sociologists have
 done more work on the field than historians, but
 they have left us with the impression of institutions
 as mere social rather than economic organizations.
 For example, N. A. Fadipe (1970: 256) describes
 rotating savings and credit associations (henceforth
 referred to as roscas), the ajo and esusu among the
 Yoruba, as "mutual help associations," a mislead-
 ing definition that has been further slandered by
 A.G. Hopkins (1973: 70) who states that roscas
 are "devoted mainly to social purposes, such as
 raising money for funerals." It is necessary to
correct such misconceptions and place roscas in
 proper perspective as economic institutions which
 the level of societal sophistication and needs in
 preindustrial times could possibly devise.
 More recently, especially since the 1980s, tradi-
 tional savings and credit markets have come under
 sharp focus partly because of the new emphasis
 on rural development and partly because of the
 need for creditor nations and international orga-
 nizations to understand the problems of screening
 and enforcement in debtor countries. Conducted
 almost exclusively by economists, these studies
 have advanced the frontiers of our knowledge of
 traditional credit markets - albeit from the nar-
 row economic angle. Interested in "the application
 of economic behaviour" to underdeveloped rural
 economies, these studies are still grappling with
 the problem of definition. Thus, there is some
 controversy on the proper characterization of tra-
 ditional credit markets: are they competitive or
 monopolistic? Even when it is admitted that they
 are imperfect or incomplete markets, it has been
 difficult to come up with a theoretical paradigm
 that holds for most societies with a variety of
 savings and credit institutions. Moreover, there are
 not enough empirical studies upon which to build
 n enduring theory. The kind of thing that Joseph
 Stiglitz (1990) has done, which enables him to
 propound the model of "peer monitoring" in tradi-
 tional credit markets, can only be tentative, based
 as it were on four empirical studies of northern
 Nigeria, Thailand, India, and Pakistan.
 The necessity for this study is, therefore, estab-
 lished: the existing studies are insufficient to guide
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 longer term policy measures, and they leave too
 many gaps. In essence, the main objective of this
 essay is, focusing on the Yoruba of southwestern
 Nigeria, to examine the origin, development, fea-
 tures, modes of operation, problems, challenges,
 and impact of traditional (or informal) savings and
 credit institutions in Africa.
 a) Definition of Terms
 For clarity, it is necessary to define a number
 of terms employed in the essay. Firstly, what is
 saving? J. M. Keynes (1936: 61) defined saving as
 the "excess of income over expenditure on con-
 sumption." This definition has been employed by
 government agencies in Western societies to es-
 timate consumer saving. However, Robert Ferber
 (1964) has identified four senses in which saving
 is used: the process of accumulating money or
 material goods for future use; the flow of money
 or resources that is accumulated during a particular
 period; the process of economizing or conserving
 on resources; and those resources which are kept
 in being by such economizing. There can be no
 doubt that Ferber' s characterization is very wide,
 but only upon such a wide conception of saving
 can a meaningful discussion of precolonial African
 saving institutions be understood. Utilizing these
 four usages, it is obvious that saving as an eco-
 nomic habit was not alien to precolonial African
 societies. According to T. A. Oyejide (1977: I),13
 "in general, most people save a part of the increase
 in their income." Furthermore, Oyejide has identi-
 fied six main ways by which a saver disposes of
 his savings: "He can add to his cash balances, i.e.,
 hold more cash; he can directly purchase capital
 (investment) goods as an entrepreneur; he can re-
 pay outstanding loans or make fresh ones; he can
 purchase securities from business organizations, fi-
 nancial institutions or government agencies; he can
 place his excess cash in some savings instruments;
 or he can make grants or gifts" (1977: 1).
 It is instructive to note that many of these ave-
 nues for saving were available in precolonial soci-
 eties, but modern (or Western) saving instruments
 or institutions, especially banks (in the narrow way
 in which banks are now known), were lacking.
 This necessarily leads to the question: What are
 banks, and what is banking? A bank deals in
 money and money substitutes, and provides a wide
 range of financial services. In a strictly formal
 sense, it borrows or receives deposits from firms,
 individuals, or governments, and makes loans to
 customers. It covers its expenses and earns profits
 by borrowing at one (lower) rate of interest and
 le ding at a higher rate. In a general sense, howev-
 er, a bank is an establishment for keeping money
 and valuables safely.14 This general definition is
 employed in our treatment of banking in traditional
 societies, and it does not necessarily contrast with
 the formal sense of the term.
 The types of institutions for saving money
 which were developed in traditional African so-
 cieties, and which are still in operation in many
 places today, were those that suited the econom-
 ic pursuits, social organization, and cultural set-
 ting. These institutions are examined historically
 here. It should suffice to say at this stage that
 the increasing Westernization of society since the
 colonial era, and the economic changes since the
 Second World War in Africa, have affected both
 the rural and urban areas and the traditional insti-
 tutions available in them. As the changes became
 increasingly severe, particularly as the rate of ru-
 ral-urban migration rose, the contrast between the
 rural areas which are still sustained largely by tra-
 ditional institutions, and the urban areas which are
 served by Western institutions, became sharp. Pol-
 icymakers, with little justification, concluded that
 the rural sector has remained backward because of
 low saving and reliance on inefficient economic
 institutions. In Nigeria, for instance, it was felt in
 1977 that rural wealth had to be mobilized, pooled,
 and made available for national development. This
 reasoning ultimately led to the introduction of the
 Rural Banking Program (O. Ojo 1983) which ex-
 tended Western saving instruments (banks) to the
 rural areas hitherto predominantly served by the
 traditional system. The point which was missed
 (and which soon became clear when these Rural
 Banks could not generate enough revenue to cover
 their operational cost, not to talk of making profit)
 was that the rural areas were poor not because they
 had no banks but because they were poor.15
 This disappointing result has been noted in oth-
 er parts of the world where the assumption has
 13 In spite of this wide conception of savings, however, Oye-
 jide still betrays the preference of his discipline by bad-
 mouthing traditional approaches to saving.
 14 Goldsmiths in Africa did not play the same role in the
 development of money and banking as their counterparts in
 Western Europe. Indeed, African banking institutions did
 not rely on smiths possibly because coinage was not very
 widespread.
 15 This may sound tautological, but the point will be proved
 later in this essay. It should suffice to say here that the rural
 areas are not the only places where the traditional banking
 institutions have survived.
 Anthropos 89.1994
This content downloaded from 130.218.12.44 on Mon, 11 Feb 2019 17:37:10 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 392 A. G. Adebayo
 been that traditional societies lacked the dynamic
 institutions. Although we disagree with Clifford
 Geertz's view (1962: 242), that non-Western econ-
 omies are necessarily static, his explanations for
 the failure of government-sponsored intervention
 in the traditional sector are valid: "[T]he first
 because deep-rooted customs yield very little to
 official sponsored exhortations to discard them in
 the interest of progress; and the second because the
 impersonality, complexity, and foreignness of the
 ode of operation of such 'capitalist' institutions
 tends to make the traditionalistic peasants, small
 traders, and civil servants suspicious of them."
 What are roscas? Roscas are numerous and
 varied; and any definition, to be acceptable, must
 allow the inclusion of those various properties. It
 is difficult to accept Geertz's position that "the
 basic principle upon which the rotating credit as-
 sociation is founded is everywhere the same," and
 that that principle is: "a lump sum fund composed
 of fixed contributions from each member of the
 association is distributed, at fixed intervals and as
 a whole, to each member in turn" (1962: 243). As
 Shirley Ardener has pointed out, this description is
 too restrictive: "Contributions are not ... always
 fixed . . ., and the whole of the lump sum is not
 always received by a member
 Geertz's definition, Ardener has proposed another
 that roscas be taken as "an association formed up-
 on a core of participants who agree to make regular
 contributions to a fund which is given, in whole
 or in part, to each contributor in rotation" (1964:
 201). This definition is much more appropriate,
 for it includes the two elements of regularity and
 rotation which Ardener regards as the "essential
 criteria" that differentiate roscas from "the whole
 range of mutual benefit clubs and co-operative
 undertakings" (201).
 The existing literature has documented the ex-
 istence of roscas in virtually all parts of the Third
 World. Shirley Ardener has recorded its existence
 in Asia (in several parts of China, India, Ma-
 laya, Vietnam), Africa (among the Yoruba, Igbo,
 Ibibio, Tiv, Nupe, Hausa of Nigeria; the Cre-
 ole of Sierra Leone; several ethnic groups in the
 Cameroon, Ghana, Zambia, Malawi, South Africa,
 Egypt, Sudan, etc.), and the Americas (Barbados,
 Trinidad, Guyana, etc.) (1964: 202-209). Unlike
 most anthropologists, Ardener made some efforts
 at explaining the origins of roscas; however, the
 attempt fails partly because the available evidence
 was (and still is) scanty, and partly because of the
 eagerness to employ the diffusion theory (1964:
 208-210). Therefore, our discussion of the Yoruba
 experience has proceeded against the background
 of these known features and operations of roscas
 in other parts of the world. The advantage of such
 a comparison is apparent: it builds trends into
 the somewhat static treatment that anthropologists
 have adopted.
 b) Ajo: a Yoruba Savings Institution
 The Yoruba have two basic institutions for saving
 and credit. The first is esusu, which was more de-
 veloped and served the people in all the senses of
 the term "savings." The second is ajo, which was
 probably devised simply to satisfy the first sense
 in which savings has been used by economists,
 i.e., the process of accumulating money. Thus, it is
 believed to have originated to replace the practice
 of burying money in the ground for safekeeping.
 Esusu a  ajo did not replace each other; rather,
 the two institutions continued to exist side by side,
 and individuals freely chose to patronize one or/
 and the other. This has led to some speculation on
the relationship between the two institutions. It is
 not clear which of them first emerged; and we are
 willing to speculate that both developed separately
 in different parts of Yorubaland, and later spread
 evenly.
 Unlike esusu, the ajo institution has n t re-
 ceived attention in scholarly writings.16 This is
 probably becaus  of the series of abuses which its
 operation had witnessed in precolonial Yorubaland
 (and continues to witness in modern times). Ajo is
 probably a short word for akojo (p ol together).
 Thus, under the ajo institution, an individual en-
 tered into an agreement with a savings coll ctor,
 paid a fixed sum of money at regular intervals
 (daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly, or, simply,
 "every market day") to this collector, and drew all
 his contribution at the end of an agreed period or
 anytime it was needed. The main attraction of this
 system, therefore, is the element of promptness,
 i.e., the contributor could draw his/her money at
 short notice, unlike in the esusu where he/she had
 to wait his/her turn. The pivot of this system was
 the alajo (the savings collector or treasurer). This
 man or woman was a mobile bank par excellence.
 Depending upon the size of his/her customers and
 the extent of their geographical spread, the alajo
 pursued this vocation either as a full- or part-time
 work, walking from one client to another to collect
 their savings.
 16 The first comprehensive reference to the ajo institution is
 in Adebayo and Adesina (n. d.).
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 Information collected from alajo11 and their
 clients reveal a lot of interesting facts on the oper-
 ation of the ajo institution. Firstly, as the society
 was nonliterate, both the alajo and the contribu-
 tors relied on the power of the human memory.
 Since this was (and still is) limited, cheating was
 not uncommon. Some contributors tried to keep
 record by drawing lines on the wall of their room
 with charcoal, but this was not foolproof as the
 alajo often insisted on the accuracy of their own
 "records." Like esusu, a round of the contribution
 was meant for the alajo, but they usually appropri-
 ated more than one round. Secondly, the alajo had
 been known to disappear with their contributors'
 money. Contributors had no way of identifying
 such charlatans before entrusting to them their
 hard-earned savings. This was probably why ajo
 contributions were usually lower than esusu con-
 tributions.
 Another main disadvantage of ajo as it was
 practised in precolonial Yorubaland was the fact
 that the fund that accumulated in the hands of
 the alajo was not made available for investment.
 Rather, because the depositor might require his
 fund at short notice, the alajo did not often make
 such funds available for borrowers. There were
 instances, however, where he had been known to
 make big loans to the state, particularly when the
 community was at war and there were promises
 of booties to be had. As society became more
 complex, the alajo also developed more compli-
 cated approaches to their operation. They began
 to extend credit to their clients and other needy
 members of the community. The alajo formed the
 nucleus of the moneylending business.
 c) Esusu: Roscas among the Yoruba
 The pioneering, and so far the most detailed and
 comprehensive study of esusu among the Yoru-
 ba, is William Bascom's article (1952). Subse-
 quent writers have unconsciously or consciously
 recycled the ideas (and speculations) in this essay.
 Indeed, for quite a long time the Yoruba name
 (esusu) was adopted for similar institutions found
 in other parts of the world.18
 The root word for this Yoruba name is su, which
 means literally pooling together or contributing.
 Esusu could, therefore, refer to that fund which has
 been pooled or being contributed into a pool. As
 Bascom (1952: 63) has correctly observed, esusu
 rarely refers to the contributors. Samuel Johnson
 (1921: 119) has defined the operation of esusu
 thus: "A fixed sum agreed upon is given by each at
 fixed time (usually every week) and place, under
 a president; the total amount is paid to each mem-
 er in rotation." Bascom, using the current curren-
 cy, further illustrates the operation of esusu thus:
 "[W]e may imagine a simple case where twenty
 members contribute one shilling each, monthly. At
 the end of twenty months, which completes the
 cycle in this case, each member will have con-
 tributed twenty shillings or one pound, and will,
 on e occasion, have received the amount of one
 pound in return."
 All evidence points in the direction that roscas
 was an ancient institution among the Yoruba. How-
 ever, it has not been possible to date its origin. If
 its emergence predated the introduction of cowrie
 currency, as we would like to argue here, and as
 the similarity between esusu and other mutual help
 associations (such as aro and owe in the supply
 f agricultural labour force19) would seem to sug-
 gest, its development was certainly assisted by the
 monetization of the economy which made more
 accurate the measurement of value as well as the
 quantification of esusu fund.
 There is little validity in the suggestion that
 esusu diffused from some other parts of West
 Africa into Yorubaland,20 although it could have
 spread throughout Yorubaland by diffusion. On the
 contrary, there is greater evidence in support of
 crediting the Yoruba with the invention of their
 own brand of roscas. Or, how could one explain
 the unique, complex features of esusui Among
 these features, Geertz (1962: 256, via Bascom
 1952) has recorded three. Firstly, membership was
 larger, and the length of a cycle was longer - "as
 many as 200 members, with cycles of four or five
 ears." This had the advantage of pooling a sizable
 sum of fund which the receiver, if a businessman
 or woman, was able to put to good use. On the
 17 In Yoruba language, the same expression is used for sin-
 gular and plural. In this specific instance, alajo expresses
 both singular and plural of the term.
 18 This was before Clifford Geertz came up with the name
 "rotating credit association," while Karla Hoff and Joseph
 E. Stiglitz (1990) refined F.J.A. Bouman's renaming to
 come up with "roscas."
 19 In aro, a small group of friends or relations (between three
 and seven) form a club, all members of that club go to work
 in one member's farm in turn. This is usually organized
 during the rains when weeds grow fast and need to be
 cleared even faster.
 20 This suggestion is contained in a passage in Ardener s
 otherwise balanced essay thus: Mention was made earlier
 of connections between Trinidad, Sierra Leone, and Yoruba
 country through the various forms of esusu.
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 other hand, those who had yet to collect their fund
 were forced to save and tie down their money. The
 situation could be more pathetic if the esusu died
 "on the road," as sometimes happened.21
 Secondly, the larger esusu groups formed some-
 thing akin to a bureaucracy: "the head of the esusu
 may not even be personally acquainted with all its
 embers; his relations are mainly with the sub-
 group heads" (Geertz 1962: 256). On this point,
 Bascom has been more elaborate. According to
 him, "the larger esusu groups are divided into four
 or more subgroups or 'roads' (ona), which are
 numbered (first, second, third, fourth) according
 to the order in which they receive the fund, which
 is rotated among the subgroups in turn" (Bascom
 1952: 64). Furthermore, the "members pay in and
 take out through the agency of the subgroup head,
 and it is he who determines the order of the
 distribution of the fund among members of the
 subgroup
 received the fund, every effort is made to force
 him to pay. The overall head attempts to coerce the
 subgroup head, and the subgroup head the mem-
 ber" (Geertz 1962: 256). The advantage of this was
 that the esusu head had a core of trusted assistants
 who ensured the smooth running of the associa-
 tion. These subgroup heads were also understudy-
 ing the overall head in an informal manner with a
 view to acquiring the relevant skills and experience
 to organize their own esusu independently later.
 This implies that there is some economic benefit
 to be had in being the head of an esusu: there
 was, otherwise the head would not have had the
 full commitment and devotion. On the other hand,
 these benefits may actually be derived illegally.
 This was more prevalent in the larger esusu where
 the individual had no knowledge of how many
 members there were, or how long the cycle was. In
 theory, the head was allowed to keep one round of
 the fund in order to cushion the effect of default by
 one member or more at a point in time. However,
 it was regarded as the norm for the head to keep
 more than one round to himself,22 even though
 respected members of the community (such as
 chiefs, princes or princesses, successful merchants
 or farmers) were selected to head esusu.
 The third unique feature is that the number
 of members does not always coincide with the
 number of memberships. "A singl  individual may
 hold more than one 'membership' in a given esusu
group by regularly making more than on  contribu-
 tion and receiving the fund more than once during
 a single cycle. Conversely,  single 'memb rship'
 may be shared by two or more individuals who are
 not able to afford the entire contribution se arate-
 ly" (Bascom 1952: 64). Our recent investigation
 reveals that what Bascom calls "membership" is,
 in Yoruba economic terms, known as owo (hand).23
 A membership was one owo: One affluent member
 could contribute two or more owo (and receive
 the fund more than once); while two or more less
 affluent members could jointly contribute one owo.
 This had the advantage of e coura ing the rich as
 well as the poor to save according to their indi-
 vidual capacity; also, it pooled resources together
 from every strata of society and placed them at
 one ime or another at the disposal of the needy
 contributor, businessman or farmer.
 If we agree that esusu is "native" to Yorubaland,
 we s ill have to deal with the da e of its origin.
 Shirley Ardener (1964: 209, via Biobaku 1957: 26)
 seems to support a 19th century introduction. Our
 investigations indicate a much earlier origin. Esusu
 is known to have been practised by Oyo traders
 in the era of alaafin Abiodun who reigned in
 the 1770s (which was also associated with the
 mpire's expanded economic activity through par-
 ticipation in the Atlantic trade) (Law 1977). We
 suggest that the institution could have been ex-
 ported to the West Indies at about this time, where
 it has survived in Trinidad under its Yoruba name.
 In addition, it is possible that the institution had
 developed much earlier than this time, if we agree
 to generalize Ardener's finding (1964: 221) with
 respect to the Mba-Ise Igbo that roscas constituted
 one of the causative factors in the "transition from
 a mainly agricultural to a predominantly trading
 economy."
 The foregoing discussion can be summarized.
 Firstly, roscas (esusu) among the Yoruba was simi-
 lar to other mutual help organizations in the society
 (such as aro in agricultural labour supply) and
 could be rightly taken as a social organization to
 assist members in very stringent financial prob-
 lems, such as the need to meet obligations aris-
 ing from ordinary marriage, funeral, and religious
 functions (including the cost of an important sacri-
 fice) to more economically rewarding or pressing 21 For esusu, to "die on the road" is for it to die prematurely.
 Bascom has applied this in a narrow sense to mean the
 inability of one member to keep up his/her contribution.
 This is actually the beginning of the "death."
 22 According to Bascom (1952: 68), "it is thought to be unlike-
 ly that the esusu head could take a third round for himself
 during the cycle without being caught."
 23 Bascom' s interpretation of owo is slightly different from our
 finding. Oral tradition collected in Iwo indicates that owo
 is money "handed in," which could mean the contribution
 made by or given to an individual.
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 needs to expand business or farm, or even to pros-
 ecute a war or pay a debt. Secondly, roscas, along
 with other institutions in precolonial Yoruba soci-
 ety, helped in bridging the gap between the rich
 and the poor; for, it brought both classes together
 in the same organization.24 This was an advantage
 when one considers the role of esusu in the process
 of capital formation among the Yoruba. Thirdly,
 roscas among the Yoruba were neither "curious
 economic institutions," an "adaptation to a condi-
 tion of poverty or relative deprivation" (as Donald
 Kurtz [1973] would have us believe), nor were
 they a "middle rung" in development (as Clifford
 Geertz [1962: 261] has asserted), but rational eco-
 nomic institutions developed to meet the needs of
 members of society. These derogatory terminolo-
 gies arise from the effort of scholars to use foreign
 standards to judge the development of other people
 and their institutions. It cannot be overemphasized
 that scholars should endeavour to evaluate a peo-
 ple's economic and other institutions within the
 context of their historical experiences. However,
 many historians have not paid attention to this. For
 instance, Geertz has argued that roscas bridge the
 gap "between agrarian and commercial economic
 patterns and between the peasant and trader atti-
 tudes toward money and its uses." 25 On the other
 hand, we know that the gap between the peasant
 and trader was not so wide. Although there was
 occupational specialization, variegation in African
 precolonial economies did not quite resemble the
 Western notion of dichotomy between agriculture,
 industry, and commerce. Rather, through the ex-
 tended family and other networks, all members of
 different occupational groups were in close touch
 with each other; and, within the same compound,
 farmers, craftsmen, and traders often belonged to
 the same esusu society. In addition, there was little
 differentiation between the urban and rural settle-
 ments, as dwellers of the latter regarded the former
 as "home" with which they maintained perfect
 and constant contact and to which they returned
 during every major festival. Thus, even though
 the major market centers were located in the cities
 and towns, the traders were both from outlying
 villages and distant towns. Esusu, therefore, did
 not bridge a gap (there was none to bridge), rather
 it reinforced the integrated rural-urban interactions
 and pooled resources across the board.
 d) R scas and Capital Formation
 in Precolonial Yoruba Society
Roscas in precolonial banking and finance did not
 have the same structure as modern banks; howev-
 er, they performed in precolonial Africa the same
 fun tions that banks now perform in these societ-
 ies. And because they were also culturally rooted,
 and the people had faith in them, these institutions
 were able to perform those banking functions more
 efficiently. The size of capital required for business
 was la ge but within manageable limits, and the
expectations of the different classes were high but
 easy to meet. We do not agree with those who
 have argued that roscas was incapable of pooling
 together a huge capital fund for the development
 o  pr vate business. We seek to differ, too, from
 th  assumption that precolonial societies lacked a
 capital market.
 Indeed, the primary function of roscas had been
 o "assist in small-scale [sic] capital-formation,"
 r to stimulate saving. Here, we find ourselves
agreeing more and more with Shirley Ardener's
 point that "members [of roscas] could save their
 contributions themselves at home and accumulate
 their own 'funds,' but this would withdraw money
 from circulation: in a rotating credit association
 capit l need never be idle. If, instead of being
 sav d at home, money were given to a treasurer to
 keep, he could put it into circulation until it was
 transferred back to the subscribers. ... an advan-
 tage of the rotating credit institution is that each
 fund (or part of it) is immediately possessed by
 one of the contributors and cannot be embezzled"
 (1964: 217). Unlike ajo where the chances of
 embezzlement were high, esusu was a great in-
 ovation in that it provided sufficient security for
 the fund. This security was reinforced by religious
 (including ritualistic) sanctions. In Oyo, for exam-
 ple, cases of cheating and misappropriation were
 revented or settled through appeal to Sango (god
 of thunder, known to strike cheats, thieves, and
 wrongdoers with thunderstorm) and Ogun (god of
 iron, known to harm those who have committed
 ac s of injustice). Moreover, in the determination
 of how members were to receive esusu funds in
 turn, a babalawo (Ifa priest) was often invited, and
 his word was accepted as final.26
 Just as banks, roscas extended a line of credit to
 members. Such loans were, however, restricted to
 members adjudged to be creditworthy by the esusu 24 It can, however, be argued that the togetherness benefited
 the rich more than the poor, because it afforded the former
 access to the little resources that the former could muster,
 and in the organization the poor had little voice.
 25 This is Kurtz's (1973: 50) beautiful summary of Geertz's
 position (1962: 261-263).
 26 It is necessary to point out here that all the cultural and
 religious backing for roscas began to weaken shortly before
 the establishment of British colonial rule over Yorubaland.
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 head or group leader. Unlike modern banking prac-
 tice, no security was required to qualify for these
 loans, a factor that continues to recommend roscas
 against modern banks. Indeed, except for the last
 member or two to take the fund, all members of
 roscas received the total fund in the form of a
 credit and continue to repay the debt till the end
 of the cycle. The advantage of Yoruba esusu credit
 over modern bank credit was principally in the
 absence of an interest.27 This is certainly "unbusi-
 nesslike" when considered in the context of mod-
 ern banking practice.28 However, the points to note
 in this instance are the communal spirit involved
 in this particular institution (esusu), the manner in
 which business was expected to serve the people
 rather than vice versa, and the existence of another
 institution for moneylending and interest charging
 (the s' ogund ogoji, literally "turn twenty to forty").
 In other words, the "unbusinesslikeness" of esusu
 was also its appeal to the poor and the rich: in-
 terest charging was frowned upon, and those who
 did such a business (moneylenders) were not well
 liked and respected in Yoruba society.
 Roscas, therefore, performed capital formation
 functions in precolonial societies. Such savings
 were made available as credit to those who needed
 them to expand their businesses or farms, or to set-
 tle an urgent financial need. Traders were known to
 have taken advantage of the funds more than any
 other groups of professionals possibly because,
 unlike craftsmen (weavers, dyers, smiths, etc.),
 traders required a great deal of capital.
 e) Savings, Credit, and Banking on the Eve
 of Colonial Rule
 It is instructive to document here the changes that
 had taken place in the ajo and esusu institutions
 among the Yoruba in the late nineteenth century.
 The entire century was a period of turbulence
 and interstate conflict in Yorubaland. War, as we
 well know, brings rapid and sometimes irrevers-
 ible changes to society and its institutions. The
 situation was not different in Yorubaland: wars,
 slavery and abolition, migration and resettlement
 of refugees, famine and general insecurity which
 characterized the century had produced remarkable
 changes in the structure, cohesion and function
 of the family, the community, and interpersonal
 relationships. These changes were bound to affect
 roscas in many different ways.
 For instance, as wars and slave raids ravaged
 the c untryside, it became exceedingly difficult to
 guarantee the successful completion of the entire
 cycle of an esusu group. Some members might
 have to flee after or before taking their funds, or
 the entire village or city might be attacked and
 destroyed. As roscas was not designed to serve a
 population on the move, many associations col-
 lapsed with the marked shifts in population from
 the north to the south. Among the major cities that
 were lost in the course of the 19th century were
 Oyo, Owu, Ikoyi, Iresa, Iwere, and Onko. This list
 does not include several minor towns and countless
 villages. Their displaced populations (i.e., those
 not sold into slavery outright) were never able to
 regroup in sufficient numbers to reactivate their
 esusu which had prematurely collapsed. Moreover,
 religious and other social sanctions were breaking
 down, traditional practices were being challenged,
 and the ruling elites in many communities were
 being replaced. In many instances, therefore, the
 insecurity to life and property was responsible for
 the development of the wrong attitude to savings
 in Yorubaland on the eve of the colonial con-
 quest. Conversely, the insecurity encouraged the
 practice of hoarding money and other valuables
 (i.e., burying them in the ground with the hope of
 coming back to recover them when normalcy was
 restored).29
 Wars have been known to bring out the ingenu-
 ity in man. For the Yoruba, the century-long wars
 did produce positive as well as negative changes.
 In the first instance, not all Yoruba states partici-
 pated in the wars all the time. In such nonbelliger-
 ent states (or between wars in the belligerent ones),
 Y ruba institutions and traditions were preserved.
 B t, even here, roscas underwent changes particu-
 arly in the length of a cycle. Esusu cycles became
 horter, and membership became smaller, with
 the possibility that participants would have taken
their turns before the next series of cataclysmic
 changes. Although long-distance trade had become
 ore perilous, the incentive to organize roscas
 had not declined. Trade in legitimate commodities
 (which had been opened in the mid- 19th centu-
 ry) required much capital and brought immediate
 27 This is to differentiate the Yoruba practice from other roscas
 elsewhere. For instance, Ardener (1964) has noticed the
 charging of interest on roscas credit in India.
 2» Ueertz (1962: 254) makes the distinction between "busi-
 nesslike" and "unbusinesslike" associations.
 29 As so many never returned to their original places of abode,
 and as those who did could not accurately identify the
 hiding places, so much money and valuables were lost.
 I should like to place on record here how a large pot
 containing thousands of cowries was accidentally found in
 my father's farm in 1967 when we were making yam ridges.
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 profit. An esusu of a few big traders was found
 to be even more effective than one composed of
 all and sundry. This increased the role of guilds in
 the generation of investment capital for members.
 Thus, membership of esusu became increasingly
 coterminous with membership of traders or crafts
 guilds. In other words, in place of the homoge-
 neous lineage, roscas began to take a cosmopoli-
 tan, heterogeneous complexion.
 An important change that roscas witnessed
 among the Yoruba in the 19th century was the
 introduction of record keeping. This arose partly
 from the activities of Christian missions in the de-
 velopment of Western education, and partly from
 the role of the returnees (Yoruba freed slaves edu-
 cated in Sierra Leone who chose to return "home"
 from 1839)30 in the social, political, and econom-
 ic development of Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, and
 other parts of the Yoruba hinterland. This develop-
 ment clearly revolutionized roscas in that accurate
 records began to be kept.
 f) The Challenge of Modern Banking Institutions
 Colonial rule everywhere served as agent for
 change and modernization. It is a different ques-
 tion entirely if such changes were desired, positive
 or far-reaching. With regard to banking and fi-
 nance, the change in the structure and operation of
 the economy, the desire to extract as much of the
 resources of the colony as possible, the reliance of
 business and industry on a greater volume of cred-
 it, and the provision that each colony should pay its
 way, inevitably paved the way for the introduction
 of modern banking and insurance systems. It is
 interesting to note, nevertheless, that the modern
 did not replace the traditional banking institutions.
 Why have ajo and esusu been resilient? Earlier
 answers to this question have emphasized the "for-
 eignness" of modern, commercial banking to tra-
 ditional economies. We seek to show here that the
 reasons could be found not merely in this "for-
 eignness," but more specifically in the manner in
 which they (the new banks) were introduced, the
 financial demands of colonial administration on the
 indigenous people, and the amenability of roscas
 to the new needs for loans and small-scale capital.
 Thus, while the formal sector has relied on modern
 banking for investment capital, the informal sector
 derives a large percentage of the initial capital
 from the traditional institutions.
 Modern banking began in Nigeria in 1872 when
 the African Banking Corporation (ABC) was es-
 tablished in Lagos.31 In addition to performing
 normal commercial bank functions, ABC was also
 charged with the distribution of Bank of England
 notes in the Colony of Lagos. In 1894, however,
 the ABC was taken over by the newly established
 Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) which was
 also charged with the importation of British cur-
rency into he colony. BBWA (now renamed First
 Bank) maintained a monopoly of banking in Lagos
 Colony (and in Nigeria) throughout the 19th cen-
 tury. Early in this century, however, the Barclays
 Bank (now called Union Bank) and the United
 Bank for Africa were established. These banks
 were established primarily to provide banking ser-
 vices to British companies and other arms of the
 colonial enterprise in Nigeria. By extension, there-
 fore, the banks provided credit facilities to favored
 expatriate businesses in Nigeria to the detriment
 of indigenous entrepreneurs. The excuse used to
 be that African business men and women lacked
 the expertise to manage modern business, and that
 they could not provide the type of collateral being
 demanded against large loans. The situation en-
 couraged the continuation of all precolonial credit
 institutions by Nigerian entrepreneurs throughout
 the colonial era.
 Nigerian entrepreneurs used to float commercial
 banks, too; but the banks often collapsed owing
 to a myriad of reasons including lack of exper-
ti e and experience, discrimination by expatriate
 banks, and discriminatory laws by the colonial
 state. The first indigenous bank to survive under
 this unfavorable colonial climate was the Nation-
 al Bank of Nigeria (NBN) established in 1933.
 Two earlier banks - the Industrial and Commercial
 Bank and the Nigerian Mercantile Bank - had
 f iled. Also, between May 1945 and January 1947,
 four additional banks were established of which
 only two - the African Continental Bank and
 the Agbonmagbe (now Wema) Bank - survived.
 The survival of these indigenous banks (NBN,
 ACB, and Wema) owed largely to the injection of
 Regional Government funds in the 1950s. Those
 other indigenous banks that lacked state backing,
 and which also lacked the requisite expertise and
 management, collapsed in the wake of the Bank-
 ing Ordinance of 1952. Such banks had emerged
 30 For more details on the history and activities of the "Saro"
 immigrants (as "Sierra Leoneans" were called), see Kopy-
 toff 1965.
 31 The discussion on modern banking in Nigeria is based on
 Ajayi and Ojo 1981.
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 during the "banking boom" of 1950-51, when 18
 indigenous banks were hurriedly established. The
 collapse of banks under colonial rule weakened
 public confidence in modern banking institutions;
 and, according to Ajayi and Ojo (1981: 16), banks
 have not recovered from this "crisis of confi-
 dence." Thus, a large number of people continued
 to save their money with the alajo and derive the
 initial capital for their business from esusu funds.
 Taxation under colonial rule indirectly encour-
 aged the patronage of roscas. The British intro-
 duced direct taxation to Yorubaland in 1918. Al-
 though the British currency had not been wide-
 ly circulated, the colonial administration insisted
 that the tax be paid not in cowries. Writers have
 shown that, to obtain the required amount, many
 farmers had to seek unskilled, poorly paid wage
 employment in the expanding colonial enterprise
 as porters and railway workers. In addition to this,
 many had to organize esusu and use the proceeds
 to pay their tax (rather than invest them). Any
 examination of the underdevelopment of Africa
 is incomplete without the inclusion of the use of
 taxation to uproot the people, suck away their
 resources, and remove from them not just a part
 of their income but the actual investment capital
 they had managed to save. The point to note here,
 however, is that the traditional savings and credit
 associations were organized in the period partly
 in order to raise enough cash to pay tax to the
 colonial and postcolonial state.
 Three features of modern (commercial) banking
 in Nigeria also deserve mention here to account
 for the resilience of roscas. Firstly, the banks
 were, from the beginning, of the branch-banking
 type, i.e., each of them maintained branches in
 different locations in the country. Secondly, the
 banking industry, like most modern investments in
 the country, has been dominated by foreign, trans-
 national banks. For instance, the three expatriate
 banks (Union Bank, First Bank, and UBA) share
 between them 50.4 per cent of the total assets of
 banks in Nigeria in 1990. These banks operate as
 capitalist institutions with the making and repat-
 riation of profit being their main goals. Thirdly,
 the siting of banks has been concentrated in the
 urban areas. For illustration, as of 1990, out of the
 1665 branches, only 602 (37 per cent) were located
 in the rural areas (Adebayo 1994). What this has
 meant is that the rural areas, where the majority
 of the people reside, have had to rely on roscas
 for savings and credit facilities, while banking
 loan policies in the urban areas have continued to
 discriminate against the small-scale industrialists
 who have also resorted to roscas.
 Government intervention in the banking and
 financial system has also lent a helping hand to the
 continued popularity of roscas among the people.
 The colonial and postcolonial state attempted to
 organize cooperatives without success; the postco-
 lonial state has gone a step further by establishing
 state-owned commercial banks and insurance com-
 panies, and by building an institutional framework
 for pooling rural savings (through the Rural Bank-
 ing Programme introduced in 1977) and making
 loans to agricultural operators (through the Nige-
 rian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, NACB),
 to industrialists (through the Nigerian Industrial
 Development Bank, NDB), and to the poor in
 general (through the People's Bank introduced in
 1990).32 For several reasons, these programs have
 not met with great success; their failures have,
 therefore, encouraged the reliance of the people
 on the time-tested institution, roscas.
 To summarize the foregoing discussion, it is
 important to recognize that traditional savings,
 credit, and banking have come a long way in Yor-
 ubaland. There is no doubt that in the precolonial
 era, when traditional norms and laws were still
 in act, and when the requirements of the econo-
 my were within manageable proportions, ajo and
 esusu were sufficient tools for pooling savings and
 sustaining a viable capital market. Traditional val-
 ues and norms came under pressure in the period
 of British colonial domination, the economy also
 witnessed fundamental changes. That ajo and esu-
 su survived these challenges is remarkable enough;
 but they cannot be expected to perform the very
 functions they used to perform before the coming
 of the great changes. Thus, whereas nowadays
roscas are seen as mere mutual help associations
 able to grant small credits to members, they had
 been banks in their time.
 Conclusion
 The study confirms some of the earlier findings
 on African financial institutions and makes new
 discoveries. Three of these new findings will form
 subject of this conclusion.
 Firstly, the study finds that African economies
 ha  been monetized before the inauguration of
 the Atlantic commerce and European colonialism.
 The impact of this monetization varied from place
 32 Among many writings, see Damachi and Seibel (eds.) 1973;
 Oluwasanmi and Alao 1965; Ojo and Adewunmi 1980;
 Lewis 1977.
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 to place. In Yorubaland, economic and social re-
 lations were transformed, and this significantly
 altered the preexisting patron-client system.
 Secondly, monetization produced banking insti-
 tutions, the rotating savings and credit associations
 (roscas), among many African peoples, including
 the Yoruba. Although these roscas cannot be de-
 scribed as being sophisticated, they were increas-
 ing in complexity by the beginning of the 19th
 century, and they had adequately served the need
 of the people in savings and small credit before
 colonial intervention. Anyone interested in find-
 ing out why Western financial institutions have
 not grown roots in an African society must begin
 from the qualities and resilience of roscas and
 how European rule arrested the growth and in-
 ternal transformation of these indigenous financial
 institutions.
 Thirdly, the paper reveals that African soci-
 eties, particularly those that were urbanized like
 the Yoruba, had a bourgeoning "middle class" be-
 fore colonialism. However, the critical questions
 answered in the study are: Who were members of
 this class? Did they wrestle with the old aristocracy
 for political power as did their European counter-
 parts? Could they be described as "capitalists"?
 Evidence from this study suggests that members
 of the Yoruba precolonial middle class subscribed
 to a form of moral economy that precluded the de-
 velopment of crass individualism and subsequently
 Western-type capitalism, but this did not prevent
 the exploitation of the poor by the rich. The class
 was still undergoing change at the end of the 19th
 century when British colonial rule came.
 The first draft of this paper was read during my lecture
 tour of four German universities in January 1992. My
 special thanks go to Professor Leonhard Harding for the
 arrangement, to Professors Haberland, Bley, and Luig for
 the opportunity to visit their institutes and departments,
 and to Dr. Charles Adesina, Tola Adebayo, and Lanre
 Amzat for assisting with the research in Nigeria. Also,
 I am grateful to Professors Paul Lovejoy, Toyin Falola,
 and Femi Taiwo for their comments. Finally, I appreciate
 the interest of the editors of this journal in the paper.
 The responsibility for the opinion and errors is mine.
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